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A campaign by civil society organisations (CSOs) turned a relatively obscure area of 
international economic law, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), into the focus for 
opposition to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – and later also the 
European Union (EU)-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). This 
article analyses how CSOs had some power in shaping the EU’s position but also highlights 
the limits of their influence. Combining insights from constructivist International Political 
Economy with scholarship emphasising the importance of emotions in the framing strategies 
of CSOs, I contend that such groups were able to create a polysemic ‘injustice frame’. 
Characterising transatlantic ISDS as a threat to democracy and the rule of law aroused anger 
and was sufficiently ambiguously framed so as to have wide appeal. The ambiguity of the frame 
and concreteness of the target, however, were also its Achilles Heel. It provided space for the 
Commission to undertake reforms to a specific element of the agreement that could also be 
legitimated in terms of their democratic credentials.  
 
1. Introduction 
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The negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the 
European Union (EU) and United States (US) have attracted much public attention. The most 
significant controversy involved the proposed investor protection provisions, in particular 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). A mechanism allowing investors to seek redress in 
independent arbitration tribunals if their ‘investor rights’ are affected by the actions of states 
was labelled ‘a full-frontal assault on democracy’ (Monbiot 2013). A European civil society 
organisation (CSO) campaign against its inclusion in TTIP (and against the agreement more 
generally) found resonance amongst key Member States such as Germany and Social 
Democratic Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). It even politicised the hitherto 
uncontroversial EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and lead 
to the agreement’s investment provisions being amended after the supposed conclusion of 
negotiations. While the TTIP negotiations appear to be headed – at the very least – for a hiatus 
with the Trump administration, CETA has gone into provisional application (with investor 
protection not yet applied, but still included in the agreement). A revised form of investor 
protection features in the EU’s other recently concluded free trade agreement (FTA) with 
Vietnam while the EU is also pushing for its inclusion in an investment agreement with Japan. 
And the European Commission is currently engaged in international discussions to establish a 
multilateral investment court, while also pursuing proposals to expedite the ratification of trade 
agreements on the back of a European Court of Justice (ECJ) opinion clarifying the division of 
competences between the EU and Member States. These are all outcomes of the TTIP investor 
protection controversy. 
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Polemic is not what policymakers in the Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for Trade 
had expected at the onset of the TTIP talks.1 They were keen to exercise the EU’s new 
competence for negotiating on foreign direct investment (FDI) acquired in the 2009 Lisbon 
Treaty, a task previously carried about by Member States through individual bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs). This was supposed to strengthen the ability of the EU to negotiate 
investment agreements with third parties (Meunier 2014, 1006). In practice, academics have 
pointed out that despite being mandated by the Treaties, the implementation of the new FDI 
competence has not proceeded smoothly due to sovereignty consciousness amongst Member 
States (e.g. Bungenberg 2011; Meunier 2014). However, this on its own does not account for 
ISDS’ politicisation: while there has been some sensitivity over inbound FDI, Member States 
‘[a]ll want to open external markets for their own investments and obtain maximum protection 
for these investments’ (Meunier 2017, 7). Germany, for example, was concerned about 
protecting the stringency of its approach to BITs (see Bungenberg 2010).  
 
The TTIP ISDS episode is also not a straightforward story of CSO power as some Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) would claim (e.g. War on Want 2017). At a time when 
some pro-TTIP commentators encouraged the Commission to drop ISDS from the TTIP 
negotiations in order to not endanger the broader talks (e.g. Dullien et al. 2015), the 
Commission managed to craft a series of reforms that appeased several of the actors within the 
EU policy machinery key to TTIP’s (and CETA’s) ratification, notably Germany and a 
majority of Social Democratic MEPs. These reforms were not welcomed by the majority of 
                                                          
1 Interview with a European Commission official, Brussels, 10 December 2014. Interviews were conducted with 
European Commission and USTR officials and NGO and business representatives in Brussels (December 2014, 
July 2015 and February 2016) and New York (April 2015). Where their insights are directly cited, interviewees 
were promised anonymity given the sensitive nature of on-going negotiations. I also attended the stakeholder 
events at the 9th, 10th and 12th TTIP negotiating rounds and participated in a meeting of the European 
Commission’s TTIP Advisory Group on 9 October 2015 discussing the new Investment Court System proposals, 
the latter in my capacity as a European Public Health Alliance (EPHA) Trade and Investment Scientific Advisor. 
Over part of this period, I also served as President of the Health and Trade Network (of which I am currently still 
a Founding Member), another group campaigning on trade agreements. 
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CSOs, with one memorably claiming that they were merely ‘putting lipstick on a pig’ (Global 
Justice Now 2015).  
 
This article analyses how, while wielding some power to shape the EU’s position, CSOs also 
faced limits to their influence. Combining insights from constructivist International Political 
Economy (IPE) with scholarship emphasising the importance of emotions in the framing 
strategies of CSOs (Widmaier 2010; Jasper 2011; Cox and Béland 2013), I argue that such 
groups were able to create a ‘polysemic’ ‘injustice frame’. Characterising transatlantic ISDS 
as a threat to democracy and the rule of law aroused anger and was sufficiently ambiguously 
framed so as to have wide appeal – even spilling over to the negotiations and ratification 
process for CETA. The ambiguity of the frame and concreteness of the target, however, were 
also its Achilles Heel. It provided space for the Commission to undertake reforms to a specific 
element of the agreement that could also be legitimated in terms of their democratic credentials. 
While the reforms have failed to satisfy most opponents, the Commission’s counter-framing of 
TTIP as an opportunity to move ISDS towards a system of ‘public law’ has placated pivotal 
actors. Advocates of CETA were also able to successfully link opponents with the ‘economic 
populism’ associated with Brexit and Trump during the agreement’s ratification battle.  
 
In the next section, I outline the power (and potential constraints) faced by CSO framing in 
‘transnational [trade] politics’ marked by regulatory issues and civil society mobilisation 
(Young this issue; see also recent work on ‘contentious market regulation’, Laursen and 
Roederer-Rynning 2017). The focus is on the role of ambiguous (or ‘polysemic’) ‘injustice 
frames’ in breaking the ‘technocratic repression’ of elites. In the third section I consider how 
the polysemy associated with the CSO frame put the European Commission under considerable 
pressure. In response, it adapted its approach to investor protection in the TTIP and other 
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concurrent negotiations (notably CETA). The fourth section will show that the ambiguities in 
the CSO narrative allowed the Commission to present this reformed ‘Investment Court System’ 
as a radically new departure – even though it actually represented more incremental change. 
Moreover, following the UK EU referendum and the election of Trump, policymakers were 
able to effectively lump CSOs together with ‘economic populists’ and, to an extent, 
delegitimise their opposition. The final section concludes, reflecting on the importance of not 
simply equating emotions with irrationality. 
 
2. The role of emotions in advocacy framing 
Central to the politics of TTIP are discursive frames, strategically chosen and deployed by 
CSOs for their emotive content. My starting point in making this argument is that the impact 
of regulatory and investment protection is not only very difficult to quantify when compared 
to tariff elimination (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2016, 27-31), but is also extremely uncertain 
(Woll and Artigas 2007). This is especially so when considering the pre-commitment to 
arbitration implied by ISDS provisions that are often broadly interpreted (Poulsen 2015). Such 
uncertainty is central to the constructivist IPE cannon, where ideas are necessary cognitive 
instruments for actors to navigate a complex social world (Blyth 2010). One strand of research 
has examined the ‘power over ideas’ (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016, 318), where particular 
narratives are deployed strategically by certain actors to coerce (rather than convince) another 
party (Krebs and Jackson 2007).  
 
This subset of the ‘communicative discourses’ used to (de)legitimate policy (see Schmidt 2008) 
is particularly relevant in the case of CSOs, considered to be comparatively ‘weak’ in the 
traditional trade literature given the constraining logic of collective action (e.g. Dür and De 
Bièvre 2007). The literature on the sociology of social movements, in particular, has been 
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concerned with the importance of ‘collective action frames’, ‘intended to mobilise potential 
adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilise antagonists’ (Snow 
and Benford 1988, 198), the latter, for example, by ‘shaming’ policymakers (Keck and Sikkink 
1998). Assessing the relative efficacy of such frames, one of the key issues has been the degree 
to which the frames deployed by social movements or CSOs ‘resonate’, especially in terms of 
their ‘salience’ to their intended audience’s experiences and ‘cultural narrations’ (Benford and 
Snow 2000, 621-622). Following Hobson and Seabrooke (2007) we might refer to such framing 
as an instance of ‘everyday’ ‘defiance’ by weak actors.  
 
Cognitive constructivism has, however, only provided part of the picture (Widmaier 2010), as 
it misses the emotional bases of social mobilisation and protest, including when it comes to 
framing (Goodwin et al. 2001; Jasper 2011). Crucial to this ‘emotional turn’ has been a critique 
of the dichotomy often drawn between emotion and rationality (cf. Eliasson and García-Duran 
2017). Scholars of emotion in social movement theory and international politics have provided 
at least two different explanations of why this is the case. A ‘cognitivist’ (or ‘constructionist’) 
school has argued that ‘they depend on cognitions’, ‘clearly allow[ing] learning and adaptation 
to one’s environment’ (Jasper 1998, 399). To others, the basis of emotions is not necessarily 
cognitive (ideational and conscious) but often unreflective and material: emotions are innately 
biological, permeating even seemingly ‘rational’ acts (Ross 2006).  
 
It should be said that this is simplifying a complex debate in which both sides concede that 
emotions are neither entirely cognitive/ideational nor completely material (e.g. Jasper 1998, 
400-401; Ross 2006, 207-208). The seemingly distinct ontological positions may therefore be 
more of a product of a difference of emphasis than underlying meta-theoretical differences. As 
a result, and adopting a ‘hybrid position’ in this debate (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014: 496), I 
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would argue that there are both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects to emotion. They are 
consciously mediated by ideas, can be the product of unconscious, biological processes and 
may also be the product of a combination of both. In focusing on the strategic agency of CSOs, 
my emphasis is not on adjudicating the relative importance of cognitive versus non-cognitive 
sources of emotion, but on understanding how emotions influence the success of their 
(coercive) frames in delegitimising certain practices.  
 
The first step in doing so is to identify why emotion might matter in the technocratised ‘field’ 
of trade policy (Eagleton-Pierce 2013). Here it is useful to turn to Widmaier (2010). His starting 
point is Berger and Luckmann’s (1966, cited in Widmaier 2010) distinction between ‘primary 
socialisation’ – the ‘formation of unconscious and emotional attachments’ that occurs during 
childhood to basic ‘notions of ethical values, citizenship rights and the role of the state’ – and 
‘secondary socialisation’ – which in his framework corresponds to the conscious acquisition of 
knowledge relating to more specific (economic) policies. These ‘emotional-cognitive 
syntheses’ lie at the heart of economic paradigms such as Keynesianism (Widmaier 2010, 133). 
Elites’ anxiety of ‘cognitive-emotional dissonance’ (where their second-order cognitive 
frameworks no longer chime with first-order emotional attachments of the populace) leads 
them to unconsciously seek to ‘technocratically repress’ emotional influences in policymaking.  
 
Returning to trade policy, we can see such ‘technocratic repression’ at work: policymakers 
regularly dismiss concerns with the ‘sociocultural consequences of globalisation’ in the 
audiovisual industries as ‘cultural protectionism’ (Goff 2007, 176) or draw on discourses of 
external constraint – ‘we must bow to the imperatives of globalisation’ – as a means of 
legitimating potentially unpopular trade liberalisation policies (Siles-Brügge 2014). As 
Widmaier (2010, 127) points out, the ‘repression’ of emotions in policymaking is ultimately 
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counterproductive as it ‘frustrates deliberation and can exacerbate populist resentments’. It can 
thus open up the necessary space for CSOs to seize upon (first-order) popular emotional 
attachments in order to construct a powerful frame. 
 
I need to introduce two further elements of CSO framing strategies in the process of ‘emotional 
liberation’ (Jasper 2011, 12). Unlike Widmaier’s (2010) conceptual bracketing between 
conscious second-order knowledge and unconscious first-order knowledge, I consider how the 
emotional interacts with the cognitive component of the frame. The first concept is that of an 
‘injustice frame’. Social movement theorists ‘have recognised that a central element in framing 
concerns the conception of injustice that serves as a basis for articulating grievances and for 
envisioning an alternative social order’ (Carroll and Ratner 1996, 608, emphasis in the 
original). Key to this is ‘[c]oncreteness in the target, even when it is misplaced and directed 
away from the real causes of hardship’ (Gamson 1992, 32). This may lead to a situation where 
‘[t]he need for strong emotions […] may lead organizers to distort their cognitive analyses’ 
(Goodwin et al. 2001, 8, emphasis added). Although as a post-positivist I would not necessarily 
concur with Gamson’s appeal to ‘the real’, the focus on ‘injustice frames’ thus highlights how 
the ‘negative emotion’ of anger (Jasper 1998, 414) can be a part of a deliberate strategy of 
frame construction that is distinct from cognition, albeit still interacting with it. 
 
I next unpack the concept of ‘primary socialisation’. Cox and Béland have applied cognitive 
and social psychology’s concept of ‘valence’ to policy studies: ‘if policy ideas have valence, 
they would have a strong connection to people’s emotional states or moods’ (Cox and Béland 
2013, 308, 313). Individuals are thus guided in their actions not by deliberation but more 
‘intuitively’, spurred on by an ‘emotional trigger’ (Cox and Béland 2013, 311-312). To Cox 
and Béland, valence goes hand-in-hand with the concept of ‘polysemy’ – the quality of ideas 
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that are ambiguous and can thus be interpreted in multiple ways. This is because the valence 
of an idea is increased with the level of abstraction ‘because at these levels, ideas evoke more 
fundamental levels of a person’s identity’. This is said to reduce individuals’ capacity for 
rational deliberation in the formation of preferences and makes them more susceptible to snap, 
intuitive judgments based on emotional attachment (Cox and Béland 2013, 316). Such 
‘ambiguity’ can be positive in that ‘broader – and vaguer – ideas are more likely to appeal to a 
greater number of constituencies that have heterogeneous preferences’ (Béland and Cox 2016, 
432). 
 
In the hands of an appropriate ‘policy entrepreneur’ – such as a CSO – a polysemic idea can 
therefore transcend boundaries between various groups that might resist subscribing to more 
narrowly defined ideas, as well as allow such ideas to act as ‘coalition magnets’ bringing 
together a wide variety of actors in support (Béland and Cox 2016). An ‘injustice frame’ may 
thus envisage a concrete target, but the causes of injustice may still be ambiguously framed. 
While rejecting the dichotomy that Béland and Cox draw between emotions and ‘rationality’, 
it is possible to recast their focus on ambiguity and its connection to emotion as one about 
reflexive versus unflexive action. Thus, polysemic (injustice) frames can be powerful in forcing 
their targets into making ‘snap’ judgments that circumvent deeper cognitive engagement. This 
ambiguity, however, can also be a double-edged sword as it limits the power of frames as 
coercive ‘shaming’ mechanisms. While polysemic, abstract frames may act as a basis for 
‘social consensus’ (Béland and Cox 2016, 432), overcoming the shorter ‘life cycle’ of narrower 
CSO frames (Morin 2011), they are also susceptible to co-option by the very policymakers 
activists are targeting. These can more easily argue that they righting the ‘injustice’ being 
targeted by an ambiguous frame, especially if it is directed at a specific target. 
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3. Politicising Investor Protection 
Although formally an EU competence since late 2009, investor protection did not garner much 
public attention until the CSO campaign on TTIP kicked off in the summer of 2013 at the same 
time as the transatlantic negotiations. Before then, we could speak of ‘technocratic repression’ 
driven by the Commission and largely accepted by both Member States and the EP. The 
implementation of the EU-level competence was far more contentious than the merits of 
investor protection within democratic societies itself (European Commission 2010, 4-6; 8-10; 
Meunier 2014, 999). Thus, the Member States granted the Commission a mandate for the TTIP 
negotiations in June 2013 which pushed for the negotiation of an ‘Investment Protection’ 
chapter ‘on the basis of the […] highest standards of protection that both Parties [EU and US] 
have negotiated’ and featured ‘an effective and state-of-the-art investor-to-state dispute 
settlement mechanism’ (Council of the EU 2013, 8). 
 
The Commission justified the inclusion of investor protection provisions as a means of 
‘supporting the competitiveness of European enterprises’, helping to boost FDI flows 
(European Commission 2010, 5). This line on investor protection was also supported by the 
Member States in their TTIP mandate (Council of the EU 2013, 8) and by the EP in a 2011 
plenary resolution on EU investment policy, which also did not oppose ISDS but merely called 
for some reform (EP 2011). In its first TTIP resolution (May 2013) the EP also failed to 
specifically identify ISDS as an area of concern in the TTIP talks (EP 2013). Crucially, the 
Commission’s frame regarding the merits of investor protection echoed later economistic 
discourses in favour of TTIP’s ‘growth and jobs’ potential (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2016, 
13-37) that stemmed from an explicit strategy of managing ‘cognitive-emotional dissonance’ 
(Widmaier 2010). In a leaked paper on its communication strategy for TTIP, the Commission 
explicitly spelled out its anxiety over the nature of public debate on the agreement – and the 
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need to repress (or, in its own words, ‘define’ in a ‘proactive’ manner ‘the terms of the debate’) 
potential value-based, emotional concerns with the likes of ‘negotiating data privacy’ or 
‘lowering EU regulatory standards’ (European Commission 2013a).  
 
The CSO campaign and frame 
Some would claim that the CSO campaign was kicked off by German organisations that 
‘reached out to NGOs in other European countries’ (Bauer 2016, 6). However, the assessment 
here is that the campaign was started in the summer of 2013 by key members of the ‘Seattle-
to-Brussels’ network of NGOs, notably Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) and ‘other 
veterans of the first major mobilisation against trade and investment agreements of the late 
1990s and early 2000s’ (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2016, 102).2 These organisations set the 
tone of the campaign by arguing that ISDS in TTIP (and later CETA) represented a threat to 
democracy and sovereignty. Corporations would be able to bypass domestic courts in secretive 
investment tribunals, potentially saddling governments with costly lawsuits for decisions taken 
in the public interest (e.g. CEO 2013; Friends of the Earth Europe 2014). In the words of British 
environmentalist George Monbiot (2013) (himself drawing on CEO reports), ISDS was a ‘full-
frontal assault on democracy’ allowing ‘rapacious companies [to] subvert our laws, rights and 
national sovereignty’. CSOs also often drew on the metaphor of the ‘Trojan Horse’ to describe 
TTIP (e.g. Friends of the Earth 2014) insofar as (false) promises of ‘growth and jobs’ were 
used to disguise the affront to democracy and the rule of law represented by ISDS in particular.  
 
                                                          
2 The Seattle-to-Brussels network was founded in the early 2000s by European organisations in what some have 
called the ‘global justice movement’ (see Della Porta 2007) to campaign on trade policy issues. Its membership 
includes both national organisations – such as branches of the ‘Association for the Taxation of Financial 
Transactions and for Citizens’ Action’ (ATTAC), Friends of the Earth and the UK-based Global Justice Now – 
and Brussels-based and/or transnational organisations like CEO, Friends of the Earth Europe and the 
Transnational Institute (for more on the role of the network in the case of TTIP, see Strange 2015; for a full list 
of members, see Seattle-to-Brussels 2017). 
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This represents a strong appeal to abstract, and widely held values of the sort that Berger and 
Luckmann (1966, cited in Widmaier 2010) would associate with ‘primary socialisation’. We 
can therefore see the sort of ‘cognitive-emotional dissonance’ created between these arguments 
about democracy, sovereignty and the rule of (EU) law and the Commission’s economic (and 
technocratic) defence of ISDS as a means of encouraging FDI flows (and by extension growth 
and jobs). Campaigners may have thus also been tapping into broader public discontent over 
the ‘technocratic repression’ associated with European integration and with the move from a 
‘permissive consensus’ to a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009; see also 
Novotná 2016). In the UK, for example, a number of anti-TTIP groups made much hay of the 
agreement – and ISDS especially – to highlight the threat that this, and the fact that it was the 
EU negotiating it, represented to the National Health Service (e.g. Hilary 2015). There was, of 
course, variation across EU Member States in the degree of public mobilisation on the issue, 
with Germany leading the pack. This could be seen by some as being a product of differences 
in the intensity of the CSO campaign rather than in the resonance of the frame (Bauer 2016). 
While there is no space here to explore this issue, I would argue that the nature of the frame 
itself was instrumental in putting certain key actors under pressure, notably Social Democratic 
politicians in key Member States (especially, but not just in Germany) and across countries and 
political groupings in the EP (as argued below). 
 
The frame’s polysemy also made it a useful ‘coalition magnet’ amongst CSOs. Criticism of 
TTIP and ISDS did not just involve the ‘usual suspects’ of Seattle-to-Brussels network 
members which had initiated the campaign. It subsequently also drew in CSOs either not 
previously involved in trade policy such as public health groups (e.g. the European Public 
Health Alliance, EPHA) or those having previously taken a more positive view of trade policy 
– notably trade unions (including German export unions) or consumer organisations (e.g. the 
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European Consumer Organisation, BEUC) (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2017, 1495). The 
‘injustice frame’ was thus deployed by both those CSOs opposed to TTIP as a matter of 
principle (‘rejectionists’, to use a typology from Scholte 2003; see also Young this issue) – 
which comprised much of the Seattle-to-Brussels network – and those who were willing to see 
an improved trade agreement (‘reformists’) – which accounted for a number of the newcomers 
and newly critical actors.  
 
While both types of CSO were concerned over a potential erosion of levels of social, 
environmental or public health protection, and did sometimes produce joint materials (e.g. 
Friends of the Earth Europe 2015), their emphasis was somewhat different. Rejectionists billed 
the agreement as a ‘transatlantic corporate bill of rights’ (CEO 2013; see also Hilary 2015), 
bemoaning the rise of corporate power in an implicit (and at times more explicit) critique of 
(neoliberal) capitalism. Reformists, on the other hand, argued that such a mechanism was 
unnecessary between democracies with developed legal systems, pointing to its discriminatory 
nature, which privileged foreign investors at the expense of other public policy objectives, with 
some also emphasising its potential to infringe EU law (e.g. BEUC 2014; T&E 2014; 
ClientEarth 2015). Turning to their approach to campaigning, rejectionists therefore largely 
focused on an ‘outside strategy’ (targeting public opinion, and thus policymakers indirectly). 
While reformists also pursued this, a number of such CSOs also pursued an ‘inside strategy’ 
of influencing policymakers directly, e.g. by participating in the TTIP Advisory Group3 set up 
by DG Trade (on this distinction, see Dür and Mateo 2014). 
 
                                                          
3 CSO members of this group at the time of their last meeting in March 2017 included representatives of EPHA, 
BEUC, Transport and Environment (T&E), the European Environment Bureau, the Danish Consumers’ 
Organisation (Forbrugerrådet) and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (European Commission 
2017e, 6). 
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While being open to multiple interpretations, the frame focused on the concrete ‘injustices’ of 
a specific instrument (ISDS), used by clearly identified wrong-doers (transnational 
corporations) and with implications for citizens’ everyday lives. Gheyle (2016, 19) points out 
that CSOs were helped by the prominence of a number of concrete, high-profile ISDS cases in 
Europe at the time of the start of the TTIP negotiations. German campaigners, for example, 
often picked up on a case involving Vattenfall – a Swedish energy firm suing the German 
government for the latter’s (fairly popular) policy of phasing out nuclear power (Campact 
2016). Even where there were few or no ISDS cases involving the national government, as in 
the UK, campaigners were able to link claims against developed countries elsewhere to on-
going policy discussions at home, for example tobacco firm Phillip Morris’ claim against 
Australia for the latter’s plain packaging laws. This happened even after the latter successfully 
saw off the claim (Taylor 2015). Key was the perception (notably, but not exclusively, in 
Germany) that US multinationals were particularly ‘rapacious’ and a threat to the European 
social market economy (Mayer 2015, 47-48; see also Eliasson and García-Duran 2017). While 
the Seattle-to-Brussels network had already been highlighting the menace to democracy posed 
by the EU’s new investment policy competence (and especially ISDS) since the Treaty of 
Lisbon (e.g. Seattle to Brussels 2010, 2012), including in reference to CETA, it was only when 
it chose to draw on these ready-made materials in the early phase of the anti-TTIP campaign 
(e.g. CEO 2013; CEO et al. 2013)4 that the ‘injustice frame’ acquired resonance. To be more 
precise then, we should refer to the powerful emotive content of a frame focusing on 
transatlantic (US-centred) investor protection from a European perspective.5 
 
                                                          
4 Interview with an NGO representative, Brussels, 10 December 2014. 
5 This might also explain why TTIP never acquired the same salience in the US, despite contacts and joint 
statements between US and European groups (e.g. in the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue). The focus of US 
trade policy controversies was more on the perceived job losses from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, while several 
key US CSOs saw TTIP as a means of potentially increasing the stringency of US social, environmental or 
consumer regulations (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2016: 101-2). 
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The decision by Seattle-to-Brussels to focus on ISDS in their early campaigning on TTIP also 
reflected the long-standing ‘Dracula strategy’ of rejectionist CSOs. In the words of prominent 
UK trade campaigner John Hilary (2016), the idea was to ‘expose the vampire [agreement] to 
sunlight and it will die’. This strategy had been at the heart of a late 1990s campaign against 
investor protection and liberalisation in the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI), which had kicked off with the coordinated leak and analysis of the draft text (Johnston 
and Laxer 2003, 53). The focus on ISDS during this campaign was identified by long-time 
ATTAC France activist Susan George (2015, 76) as ‘the best single tool in the activist kit for 
practising the “Dracula Strategy”’ (on the prominence of ISDS in the MAI campaign, see 
Graham 2000, 37-49). The continued role of such veteran campaigners in the Seattle-to-
Brussels network may therefore be part of the explanation as to why the network chose to focus 
on ISDS in its post-Lisbon campaign materials and was subsequently quick to draw on these 
to launch its TTIP campaign. Their experience of previous episodes of contestation may have 
led them to see this as a potentially effective discursive strategy. In this vein, another 
experienced activist stressed the importance in the early TTIP campaign of being able to draw 
on existing analysis of draft CETA texts (given the lack of publicly available TTIP negotiating 
texts at the time) and described the issue of ISDS in TTIP as an easy target.6 
 
Although interviews with NGO representatives from both reformist and rejectionist CSOs 
suggested that these groups had a genuine concern regarding investor protection, a number of 
interviewees identified TTIP’s regulatory cooperation and coherence provisions as being at 
least equally if not more problematic (in some cases) than ISDS. However, and following the 
initial targeting of ISDS by Seattle-to-Brussels, a number of NGO representatives themselves 
conceded that this concrete part of the agreement became a central element in the campaign 
                                                          
6 Interview with an NGO representative, Brussels, 10 December 2014. 
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against or to reform TTIP. Some also stressed that it was much more difficult to campaign on 
these other ‘technical’, regulatory issues,7 echoing the sentiments expressed by George 
regarding the suitability of ISDS as a ‘Dracula-like’ issue. The implications of these are more 
difficult to communicate as emotively as ISDS: once the Commission abandoned some of its 
more radical proposals (see De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2016, 75-6) they became instruments of 
‘soft law’ largely affecting the agenda-setting process and thus did not appear to prima facie 
violate core principles of democratic decision-making as they do not formally usurp the powers 
of legislators or domestic courts (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2017, 1497).  
 
Similar considerations likely also informed the very focus on previous ISDS cases, which may 
involve very different provisions to the ones being contemplated in TTIP, rather than the more 
general ‘chilling effects’ of investor protection. While it is true that the high-profile examples 
of ‘chlorinated chicken’ and hormone-treated beef were also successfully used by CSOs 
(especially in Germany) to highlight the dangers of regulatory alignment/cooperation and 
corporate power, in contrast to ISDS cases these remained hypothetical8 and were thus likely 
to be seen as more susceptible to the Commission counter-argument that it had no intention of 
watering down food safety regulations.  
 
The initial impact of the CSO campaign 
The CSO campaign – which, as we saw, brought together a rather broad church of organisations 
– was successful at raising the profile of the issue of investor protection and in forcing the 
Commission to adapt its approach to the issue. Following a few months of considerable 
pressure from the EU-level NGOs the Commission announced in January 2014 that it was 
                                                          
7 Interviews with NGO representatives, Brussels, 14 December 2014, 16 and 17 July 2015 and 26 February 2016 
8 Less hypothetical cases such as the dilution of the fuel quality directive were also mentioned (Friends of the 
Europe et al. 2014), but these never had the traction of the food safety examples.  
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suspending negotiations on investor protection, pending a public consultation (held March-July 
2014). The summer of 2014 also saw the launch of a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) against 
TTIP and CETA. Although rejected for formal submission by the European Commission, it 
attracted 3.3 million signatures by the time it was closed in October 2015 (Stop TTIP 2016). 
Support for TTIP in the Eurobarometer polling also declined EU-wide over the period of the 
talks – from a net approval rating of 33 percentage points in November 2014 to 19 percentage 
points two years later (on the ‘constraining’ role of public opinion, see also Novotná 2016). 
While there were large inter-state variations, key Member States like Germany (where net 
approval dropped from -2 to -20 percentage points) and France (a drop in net approval from 18 
to 1 percentage points) experienced particularly dramatic declines in support.9 Over this period, 
several national parliaments also adopted a critical line on ISDS, including Austria’s National 
Assembly, the Dutch Lower House and the French Senate (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2016, 
104). 
 
The issue also began attracting considerable attention from MEPs, starting in the run-up to the 
May 2014 EP elections. Illustrating the polysemic nature of the CSO framing, parties and 
groupings as diverse as the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the European Greens, the Left 
Group and the French Front National (as well as other far-right parties) strongly criticised 
ISDS, for varying reasons. The Greens’ election manifesto rejected ISDS as it would ‘allow 
private companies to sue democratically elected governments in order to protect corporate 
interests against social or environmental reforms’ (European Green Party 2014, 31), with 
similar objections voiced by the Left Group (Party of the European Left 2014). In contrast, the 
Front National’s leader Marine Le Pen referred to her party’s struggle against TTIP as one not 
only against ‘private justice for multinationals’ but, more importantly, for ‘the defence of 
                                                          
9 Author’s calculation using Standard Eurobarometer surveys, ignoring non-committal responses.  
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norms, of values and of the French model’ (author’s translation from Le Pen 2015). 
Highlighting how both pro-European and Eurosceptic arguments against ISDS have co-existed, 
a group of MEPs – including from the S&D, Green, Left groupings – eventually proposed a 
resolution in the EP that called for CETA to be referred to the ECJ to assess the compatibility 
of its investor protection provisions with EU law (EP 2016).  
 
Given the emerging din, it is important to single out the role of Social Democratic politicians. 
Within the EP, which was becoming increasingly ‘assertive’ on trade policy (Roederer-
Rynning this issue; see also Jančić 2016), these were considered key to securing a majority in 
favour of a ratification of TTIP (and CETA). Not only would a sufficient number of S&D votes 
be needed to bring the more unambiguously pro-TTIP groupings (the European Peoples’ Party 
[EPP], the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe [ALDE] and the European 
Conservatives and Reformists [ECR]) to the simple majority needed to ratify a potential 
agreement, but the S&D group itself held a hedged position in support of the agreement. This 
hinged (in large part) on the inclusion of ISDS, which the group voted to oppose at their 
meeting of 4 March 2015 on grounds that mirrored CSOs’ framing: ‘It is not reconcilable with 
the rule of law, that investors get a legal forum outside well-functioning judicial systems of the 
parties through a trade agreement’ (S&D Group 2015, 1). Moreover, over the course of the 
TTIP negotiations Social Democrats were in government in key EU Member States (notably 
Germany, France and Italy), of which the former two expressed critical views, starting with 
Germany in March 2014 (Donnan and Wagstyl 2014). This is not entirely surprising if we 
consider the evolution of public opinion on TTIP. 
 
Thus, in late 2014, the incoming Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström faced considerable 
pressure to drop the provision. Jean-Claude Juncker, the new European Commission President, 
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delegated the final responsibility for deciding on the inclusion of ISDS to Commission Vice-
President Frans Timmermans (whose dossier included the ‘Rule of Law and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’). At the time this was widely perceived as a snub to Malmström and her 
pro-ISDS line; fourteen Member States even went as far as to send Juncker a letter, calling on 
him not to water down the agreement’s investor protection provisions (Oliver and Spiegel 
2014). This could be seen as the low-point for the Commission (more specifically DG Trade) 
and its approach to investor protection. Soon after, in January 2015, it published its report on 
the public consultation, showing that 97 per cent of the 149,399 respondents were opposed to 
ISDS – although these were template-based submissions coordinated by various NGOs, with 
responses largely coming from a small number of Member States (European Commission 
2015a, 10).  
 
4. From ISDS to ICS and beyond 
The Commission used this report to begin a process of reformulating its investor protection 
proposals (see European Commission 2015b), culminating in an initial proposal for a TTIP 
investment chapter in September 2015 (European Commission 2015c). This was mildly revised 
following consultations with stakeholders, Member States and the EP and formally presented 
to US negotiators in November 2015. It sought to establish an ‘Investment Court System’ 
(ICS), where the most significant innovation was said to be a transparent and court-like 
mechanism for resolving investment disputes that included an appellate mechanism. Fifteen 
‘publicly appointed judges’ (five EU nationals, five US nationals and five third country 
nationals) would be adjudicating on cases (in tribunals presided over by a third country national 
and composed of one EU and US national each) and bound by a code of conduct (European 
Commission 2015d). It was also to be up-scaled into a full ‘multilateral investment court’ 
(European Commission 2015e). 
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From technocratic repression to co-opting injustice frames 
Irrespective of the view we take of the reforms themselves, the Commission shifted its 
discourse on investor protection. After subscribing to and defending the ISDS system in the 
past, it now argued that the ICS represented an entirely new system that addressed the concerns 
raised by critics of investor protection (European Commission 2015e,f). It put a lot less 
emphasis on the competitiveness and investment boosting potential of the proposals and now 
stressed how the ICS promised to uphold ‘the rule of law’ (Timmermans, cited in European 
Commission 2015e). The polysemic framing of ISDS by activists as a series of ‘corporate 
tribunals’ that ‘threaten democracy’, had provided the Commission with the discursive space 
to frame its reforms as a radical remaking of investor protection.  
 
Thus, the Commission claimed in a factsheet that ‘[w]hen compared with “old style” Investor 
to State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, the EU text proposal has key advantages for 
both States and investors’, notably through ‘[c]lear rules applied by impartial judges through a 
transparent and neutral process’. On the issue of the ‘right to regulate’, the EU proposal was 
said to ‘clarif[y] the content of key substantive standards of protection and the way that the 
right to regulate in the public interest is fully preserved’. This masked the fact that the proposals 
roughly corresponded to EU intentions prior to the start of the CSO campaign (European 
Commission 2015g, emphasis omitted; cf. European Commission 2010, 2014). Crucially, what 
could be said was a form of expanded arbitrator ‘roster’ – which was already agreed in the 
CETA talks (albeit under more limited circumstances) even when TTIP had only just entered 
the scene (see European Commission 2013b) – was depicted as a radical break with the past; 
the Commission no longer talked about the alternative dispute resolution mechanism of 
‘arbitration’ but rather of adjudication by ‘publicly-appointed’ and ‘salaried’ ‘judges’. 
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Meanwhile, the elimination of the possibility of parallel claims was said to help ensure that ‘[a] 
clear distinction between international law and domestic law will be maintained’ (European 
Commission 2015e): arbitration would not usurp the power of domestic courts.  
 
This framing strategy appeared targeted at the potential veto players in the EU trade 
policymaking machinery, namely Germany, its Social Democratic Party and Social Democrats 
in the EP – rather than at public opinion itself (see above on ‘inside’/‘outside’ strategies) – 
especially as it seemed to have been constructed in concert with key ‘insiders’. After initially 
voicing very critical views of ISDS, Vice-Chancellor and leader of the Social Democratic Party 
of Germany (SPD) Sigmar Gabriel sought, at a February 2015 meeting of European Social 
Democrats, to come up with a compromise proposal centred on creating an investment 
international court, having previously been engaged in conversations with the Trade 
Commissioner (EurActiv 2015). In response to the ICS proposals, he was then to state in the 
Bundestag that ‘[t]he step towards a fundamental reform [of] the investor-state court process 
is the right one’ (cited in Cermak 2015). Another SPD politician, the EP’s Committee on 
International Trade (INTA) Chairman Bernd Lange, also went from a fairly critical report on 
ISDS (protecting investor rights ‘can be attained in TTIP without the inclusion of ISDS 
provisions’; EP 2015a, 7) to (together with yet another German Social Democrat, EP President 
Martin Schulz) shepherding the EP’s second TTIP resolution through various (and somewhat 
contentious) INTA committee sessions and eventually the plenary in July 2015 (Sopinska 
2015).10  
 
                                                          
10 A key consideration may have been the perceived need to work with the EPP as ‘grand coalition’ partners, with 
the frame of ICS as ‘progressive’ providing important cover from critics. 
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This resolution talked of ‘replac[ing] the ISDS system with a new system for resolving disputes 
between investors and states’, with the more specific elements enumerated (‘publicly 
appointed’ ‘judges’, respecting ‘the jurisdiction’ of EU and Member State courts as well as the 
‘right to regulate’) being precisely those of the subsequent Commission ICS proposal (EP 
2015b). There remained some divisions within the S&D group on this (65, or just over a third 
of the group, voted against or abstained; VoteWatch Europe 2015), but having two-thirds of 
S&D MEPs on board was considered to be sufficient (if added to largely pro-EPP, ALDE and 
ECR votes) to have TTIP ratified. Member States were also largely supportive at this stage, as 
the inclusion of the ICS proposal in the EU-Vietnam FTA (where negotiations were concluded 
in December 2015) and most elements in CETA suggested (European Commission 2016a,b).  
 
Although the broad coalition of CSOs campaigning on investor protection did not splinter (with 
key ‘reformist’ CSOs on the TTIP Advisory Board remaining opposed to the proposals, see 
T&E et al. 2015),11 it faced four specific challenges in dealing with this counter-frame. Firstly, 
the discourse about its relationship to democracy was effectively co-opted by the Commission 
and those Social Democrats favouring the ICS. Including investor protection provisions was 
now presented as a means of addressing the problems of the global investment regime, in 
particular the proposal to upscale the ICS into a full-blown ‘multilateral investment court’. The 
Trade Commissioner argued that the problems of the past were associated with a system of 
‘private justice’ and that ICS represented a novel ‘public justice system’ for the resolution of 
investment disputes (Malmström 2015). Critics of ICS were thus implicitly being accused of 
opposing a progressive development, undermining the resonance of their ‘injustice frame’ with 
key ‘insiders’ (for an explicit example of this line of argumentation, see Quick 2015, 206-8).  
 
                                                          
11 Interview with an NGO representative, Brussels, 25 February 2016. 
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Secondly, in order to argue that the ICS represents nothing more than ‘Zombie ISDS’ ‘back 
from the dead’ (Eberhardt 2016, 5), CSOs had to turn to the details of the proposed provisions, 
writing in-depth, technical factsheets and reports to highlight continuity with existing system 
(e.g. T&E et al. 2015). This ran the risk of being less effective with (‘outside’) public-opinion 
than the initial emotive framing. Illustratively, one German newspaper reported that despite 
having made several negotiating texts public on the Commission website, very few people were 
actually consulting these documents three months into this much-publicised ‘transparency 
initiative’ (Kafsack 2015). Thirdly, and related to the preceding two points, the fact CSOs had 
placed many of their eggs in the metaphorical ISDS basket (emotively campaigning on TTIP 
by focusing on a concrete instrument of injustice) also meant that it was harder to fall back on 
other criticisms of the agreement – such as the regulatory cooperation and coherence.  
 
Finally, in the wake of the supposed populist ‘backlash against globalisation’ heralded by the 
vote for Brexit (June 2016) and the election of Donald Trump (November 2016), the anti-
establishment ‘injustice frame’ deployed by activists, and the polysemy of their anti-trade 
agreement discourse – shared by some far-right and populist politicians (including the French 
Front National and Trump himself) – rendered this emotive appeal vulnerable with 
policymakers (and segments of public opinion) to the Commission’s (and Member States’) 
own ‘anti-populist’ frame. This played out during the CETA ratification battle, which 
highlights how the effects of the TTIP negotiations will be felt regardless of whether these are 
successfully concluded or not. 
 
Spill-over to CETA 
Earlier in the anti-ISDS/TTIP campaign there had already been attempts to link the agreement 
to CETA (e.g. the ECI) – with some success. At the time of the conclusion of the formal 
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negotiations in September 2014 – which had been relatively uncontroversial before the start of 
the TTIP talks – the text was not initialled as is customarily the case, following German 
reticence (Willy 2014). CETA then went into an unusually lengthy ‘legal scrubbing’ phase that 
lasted until February 2016. This also unusually saw the text on investor protection changed 
from a previous ISDS model to the ICS (with only small differences to the TTIP proposal) – 
all the more remarkable because in contrast to the EU-Vietnam FTA, ICS was being inserted 
after the supposed conclusion of the negotiations. By this point, the broad coalition of CSOs 
was gearing up for the CETA ratification battle in the EU, as it was seen by a number as 
precedent-setting for TTIP (on the interaction between different trade and investment 
agreements, see Goff this issue; Meunier and Morin 2017).12  
 
But CETA was to present greater difficulties than TTIP, for two reasons: the agreement was 
already in place and it was with a trading partner that elicited fewer fears of (to cite Monbiot 
2013) ‘rapacious companies’ than TTIP. We should not forget, as noted above, that the Seattle-
to-Brussels network had previously campaigned on the inclusion of ISDS in CETA without 
generating much public interest (e.g. Seattle-to-Brussels 2012). A number of its members thus 
sought to paint CETA as ‘TTIP’s little brother’ (Global Justice Now 2016), and as a ‘backdoor’ 
for US multinationals, many of which had subsidiaries in Canada (Eberhardt et al. 2016, 3). 
Many of the CSOs which had taken a reformist position on TTIP also opposed CETA (at least 
in its current form) – emphasising the same arguments regarding investor protection and 
sometimes calling for improvements to the text (e.g. BEUC 2016; T&E 2016; ETUC 2016).  
 
This did garner some success in putting policymakers on the spot. Despite the fact that it 
requested an ECJ opinion on the EU-Singapore FTA to clarify the division of trade policy 
                                                          
12 Interview with an NGO group representative, Brussels, 26 February 2016. 
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competences (including FDI) between the EU and the Member States (likely a means of 
shoring up its own position) (Meunier 2017, 13), the Commission (under pressure from 
governments) formally presented CETA as a ‘mixed agreement’ to the Council in July 2016. 
This meant that national (and some sub-national) parliaments would also have to ratify the deal 
before its final entry into force (European Commission 2016c). Similarly, although it sought to 
have most of the agreement provisionally applied (following EP consent) prior to national 
ratifications (European Commission 2016d), the Council, under pressure from Germany and 
other Member States, insisted on excluding investor protection from the scope of provisional 
application (McGregor 2016). This was followed by a drawn out stand-off involving the region 
of Wallonia, which blocked Belgium’s signature of the agreement from late September to late 
October 2016 because of its parliament’s and regional Premier’s opposition to CETA (Novotná 
2017, 10).  
 
Wallonia justified its position in large part on the grounds (echoing CSO arguments against 
ISDS, especially of the pro-European variety) that it would potentially be contrary to European 
law and enable ‘US-based firms to attack European, Belgian and Walloon public decisions via 
their Canada-based subsidiaries’ (author’s translation of Parliament of Wallonia 2016, 3).13 As 
a result, the Council decisions authorising CETA’s signature and provisional application were 
accompanied by a mutually agreed ‘Joint Interpretative Instrument’. Thirty-eight statements 
and declarations from EU Member States and institutions were also attached to these decisions 
(Van der Loo 2016). The most important of the latter saw some of Belgium’s sub-federal 
governments declare that they would reject CETA on the basis of its existing ICS provisions 
                                                          
13 It is true that this also reflected domestic political rivalries between the (Walloon) Socialist Party and the liberal-
led coalition at the federal level (De Schamp and Frantescu 2016), with the Socialists having supported the revised 
CETA and TTIP mandates featuring ISDS whilst in the federal government. However, the issue of trade and 
investment policy only captured the attentions of elected politicians in Belgium following the national CSO TTIP 
campaign. This was led by local Seattle-to-Brussels members the National Centre for Development Cooperation 
(CNCD) and 11.11.11 and focused prominently on the issue of ISDS (Bollen et al. 2017). 
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(unless their parliaments decided otherwise) and asked for the ICS to referred to the ECJ to 
assess its compatibility with EU law (Kingdom of Belgium 2016). Further debates in the EP’s 
various committees followed, with the plenary then voting quite convincingly by 408 votes to 
254 in favour of ratifying CETA on 15 February 2017 – splitting the S&D group (95 voted in 
favour, 66 against and 13 abstentions) (VoteWatch Europe 2016). 
 
For those CSOs opposed to CETA (either tout court or in its current form), the ISDS-based 
frame ran into trouble with Member States and MEPs because it was shared by the populist 
right, leading many of these CSOs to explicitly distance themselves from such arguments (e.g. 
Bersch 2017). In addition to the arguments presented during the debates around TTIP – that 
ICS (and CETA) represented ‘progressive’ trade and investment policies, which swung the key 
powerbroker of the SPD into supporting the agreement (SPD 2016) – the Commission and 
CETA’s other advocates sought to turn critics’ polysemic injustice frame against them, linking 
it to the economic populism associated with Brexit and Donald Trump (e.g. Malmström 2017a). 
The EU’s very ‘credibility’ as an institution promoting liberal values and prosperity was at 
stake if it could not even complete a trade agreement with Canada, a country now lead by the 
photogenic posterchild of liberalism – an argument repeated by the likes of Malmström or 
European Council President Donald Tusk (EurActiv 2016). Canada’s Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau was even invited to address the EP plenary voting on CETA, giving (in one Guardian 
journalist’s words) a ‘rousing speech’ about the EU’s positive international role (Boffey 2017). 
Advocates of CETA were now also appealing to the ‘primary’, abstract values that before had 
only been instrumentalised by CSOs. 
 
The jury is still out regarding whether CSOs have successfully prevented a full implementation 
of the agreement, including its provisions on investor protection. Belgium’s sub-national 
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parliaments (as well as other Member State parliaments) can still fail to ratify CETA.14 That 
said, the ‘Joint Interpretative Declaration’ suggests a high degree of Member State consensus 
regarding the content of investor protection, essentially rehearsing key elements of the ICS text 
(European Union 2017, 2). If the ECJ were to issue an opinion that the ICS and EU law are 
compatible, following Belgium’s request pursuant to its CETA declaration, this suggests there 
would likely be considerable pressure on potential ‘hold-outs’– with CSOs’ ‘injustice frame’ 
that ISDS infringes the rule of law losing more of its potency. More generally, CSOs’ emphasis 
on one particular element of CETA (the ICS) also constrained the resonance of their other 
criticisms of the agreement (e.g. on regulatory cooperation or coherence, EPHA 2016, 12). 
 
What is more, and independently of CETA’s fate, May 2017 saw the ECJ issue its much-
anticipated Opinion 2/15. This stated that all areas of trade policy save provisions concerning 
‘dispute settlement between investors and states’ and ‘non-direct foreign investment’ fall under 
EU exclusive competence (CJEU 2017, 2). It has opened the door to a Commission proposal 
(reflected in recent proposed mandates for negotiations with Australia and New Zealand and 
recently concluded trade talks with Japan) to split future agreements into EU-only competence 
trade deals (also covering investment market access issues) and mixed competence investment 
protection agreements as a means of expediting ratification (Von der Burchard 2017; European 
Commission 2017a,b,f). While these proposals still need to be approved by the Member States, 
which may have some sovereignty-based sensitivities, we are already seeing advocates of this 
agenda increasingly turn to the sorts of arguments against economic populism first deployed 
during the CETA episode – and which will likely continue to constrain CSO campaigns 
targeting the EU’s liberal trade and investment policies. For example, Malmström (2017b, 4) 
                                                          
14 Interestingly, the Socialist-led government of Wallonia was recently ousted for reasons unrelated to this episode, 
which may have eliminated one potential veto player for CETA. 
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has spoken of ‘work[ing] with likeminded partners to shape globalisation […] When others are 
looking to build walls, we are ready to build bridges.’ 
 
In this climate, the Commission has continued its work on upscaling the ICS through a 
multilateral investment court with support from Canada (European Commission 2016e, 2017c). 
This raises the question as to whether CSOs will be able to sustain their campaign against the 
investor protection provisions envisaged by the Commission. These have largely gone 
unremarked in the case of the completed EU-Vietnam FTA featuring the ICS or the EU-Japan 
Economic Partnership Agreement talks, where negotiations on a trade agreement were 
concluded in December 2017 (European Commission 2017d). While this agreement does not 
cover investment protection, it does reflect the new policy of ‘splitting’ trade and investment 
protection, with the EU seeking to promote the ICS in its on-going negotiations on a separate 
agreement with Japan concerning ‘investment protection standards and investment protection 
dispute resolution’ (European Commission 2017f). We may yet see a return to the days where 
Seattle-to-Brussels members criticised the EU’s new competence to negotiate on investment, 
but lacked a frame with the emotiveness of the supposed threat posed by US multinationals.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The election of Trump has been an exogenous shock to the negotiations that few were 
expecting. Regardless of the outcome, however, TTIP and the anti-ISDS campaign continue to 
shape other EU trade and investment agreements. The campaign was clearly successful at 
breaking through the Commission’s attempts at ‘technocratic repression’. Forcing the 
European Commission to initially suspend and subsequently adapt its approach to investor 
protection was no meaningless feat. However, CSOs also faced constraints derived from the 
nature of the frame they deployed and the concreteness of the target. Crafting a polysemic and 
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highly emotive ‘injustice frame’ – invoking the threat to democratic decision-making from 
(US-based) corporations – may have been useful at mobilising a broad coalition of CSOs, 
inflaming public opinion and putting pivotal decision-makers under pressure. But the nature of 
this discourse was also exploited by the Commission to justify a series of more minor, 
incremental reforms to ISDS as a radical break with the past. The campaign’s focus on ISDS 
also limited the ability of CSOs to subsequently draw on other criticisms of the agreement. The 
battle over the ratification of CETA showed how CSOs’ anti-establishment ‘injustice frame’ 
was also vulnerable to accusations that civil society groups were siding with the ‘economic 
populism’ associated with Trump and Brexit. In the end, CSOs did not prevent CETA from 
going into provisional application (with investor protection not fully excised from the 
agreement), while the outcome of ECJ Opinion 2/15 and the anti-populist discourse are 
providing some cover for the Commission to put forward a proposal to (from its perspective, 
finally) expedite the process for ratifying trade agreements. Investor protection also lives on in 
the ICS found or sought by the EU in its recent agreements and negotiations and in Commission 
efforts to create a multilateral investment court, having the support of Member States and a 
significant body of MEPs. 
  
These findings point to some of the broader theoretical contributions of this article. It aims to 
provide greater insight into ‘transnational [trade] politics’ (Young this issue; see also Young 
2016) and ‘everyday political economy’ (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) by focusing on CSOs’ 
strategically emotive framing. The ISDS and TTIP episode prefigures much of the concern 
post-EU referendum and the election of Trump with the role of emotion in politics, illustrating 
how it makes little sense to juxtapose liberal rational argumentation with populist hysterics (cf. 
Eliasson and García-Duran 2017). Emotions are just as much a part of the ‘technocratic 
repression’ associated with Commission discourse on ISDS as they are part of CSO arguments, 
30 
 
even if some might argue that these frames need not all equally contribute towards creating a 
more deliberative ‘transatlantic agora’ (Birchfield this issue). In fact, the Commission’s success 
in crafting an ICS proposal that was perceived as legitimate by key powerbrokers was itself a 
result of embracing more overtly ‘emotive’ argumentation.  
 
The challenge for CSOs is thus crafting a frame that is both effective emotively, but not overly 
ambiguous or too specific in its target as is the case with many ‘injustice frames’. In this there 
might be some historical lessons from the anti-MAI campaign, where activists in Australia put 
more emphasis on distinguishing their message from that of an emerging xenophobic, anti-
establishment party (Capling and Nossal 2001, 450-1). Thus, more carefully identifying 
intended constituencies – in this case the receptive veto player represented by European Social 
Democrats – and formulating an effective frame that is not too polysemic or concrete in its 
target (e.g. that certain trade agreements threaten core functions of the welfare state) may have 
been a more appropriate strategy than appealing across the entire political spectrum on the basis 
that ISDS puts sovereignty in jeopardy. While the Commission would likely also have 
responded to such a frame, it would not have been in as strong a position to equate it with 
economic populism.  
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